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An epochal opportunity to elucidate the pathogenic mechanisms of
psychiatric disorders has emerged from advances in genomic technology,
new computational tools and the growth of international consortia commit-
ted to data sharing. The resulting large-scale, unbiased genetic studies have
begun to yield new biological insights and with them the hope that a half cen-
tury of stasis in psychiatric therapeutics will come to an end. Yet a sobering
picture is coming into view; it reveals daunting genetic and phenotypic
complexity portending enormous challenges for neurobiology. Successful
exploitation of results from genetics will require eschewal of long-successful
reductionist approaches to investigation of gene function, a commitment to
supplanting much research now conducted in model organisms with
human biology, and development of new experimental systems and compu-
tational models to analyse polygenic causal influences. In short, psychiatric
neuroscience must develop a new scientific map to guide investigation
through a polygenic terra incognita.
This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘Of mice and mental
health: facilitating dialogue between basic and clinical neuroscientists’.
1. Introduction
Research on such disabling psychiatric illnesses as schizophrenia, mood disorders
and autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) has been stymied by the complexity of the
human brain, its inviolability in life and a dearth of neuropathological clues to
pathogenic mechanisms. Even when anatomic stigmata of psychiatric illnesses
have been identified, molecular information has not been evident. For example,
structural magnetic resonance imaging in schizophrenia demonstrates excessive
thinning of prefrontal and temporal cerebral cortex [1]. Post-mortem examina-
tion suggests that such pathologic grey matter loss results from a decrement in
synaptic spines [2]. However, in contrast to the biochemical neuropathology
found in late life neurodegenerative diseases, such as aggregates of Ab, tau and
a-synuclein, the structural abnormalities of schizophrenia do not directly impli-
cate molecular mechanisms. Further, the cognitive and behavioural functions of
the human brain most germane to schizophrenia, mood disorders, ASDs, and
other early onset psychiatric disorders have proven particularly difficult to
model in laboratory animals [3]. Such obstacles of nature have been further com-
plicated by nature’s human interpreters who have imposedmyriad discontinuous
diagnostic categories [4] on disorders that are better conceptualized dimension-
ally, i.e. as quantitative deviations from health and as continuous symptoms
spectra that cut across conventional disorder boundaries [5]. Even as neuroscience
has flourished during the last several decades, such difficulties caused the
neurobiological analysis of psychiatric disorders largely to founder.
Genetic analysis that associates phenotypes with specific variations in DNA
sequence is a powerful tool for discovering the molecular underpinnings of heri-
table traits, including disease risk. The promise of genetics for psychiatry was
long recognized based on the observations that schizophrenia, moods disorders,
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ASDs, and other such illnesses run in families and exhibit high
heritabilities in twin studies [6,7]. Heritability is a measure of
the influence of genes, compared with non-genetic influences
such as environment, on the variation of a trait in populations.
The concept of heritability has been misused in policy debates,
for examplewith respect to the malleability of traits [8]. For the
purposes of this discussion, the significant heritability of psy-
chiatric disorders is important because it justifies investment
in genetic analyses as a route to gaining biological insights.
Genetic information has particular utility for ferreting
out causal mechanisms underlying a trait because a person’s
germ line DNA sequences are determined at the earliest
stage of embryo formation. Thus, a DNA sequence variant
that has been rigorously associated with a trait, such as schizo-
phrenia risk, can be inferred to participate in causation.
Because DNA sequences are determined ab initio with respect
to each human being, this is a rare instance inwhich association
can indicate causation. All other biological observations associ-
atedwith a disease could play roles in causation, but could also
be a result of the disease, represent an adaptation, or be con-
founded by prior treatment. Such assertions of scientific
value come with caveats. As a result of stochastic errors in
DNA replication that occur during the formation of the billions
of somatic cells of the human body, germ-line DNA sequences
may undergo mutation, including within neurons and glia of
the developing brain where they could participate in disease
pathogenesis [9]. Such genomic mosaicism contributes to
some brain disorders, for example some focal epilepsies that
result from somatic mutations that confer abnormal growth
properties on affected cell lineages. That said, the familial trans-
mission and high heritabilities of common neuropsychiatric
disorders means that notwithstanding potentially pathogenic
roles for somatic mosaicism, epigenetic modification, and
other biological processes that influence genome structure
and gene expression, germ line genomic sequences explain
much of variance for many psychiatric disorders. A second
caveat is that, the causal influence of a disease-associated
DNA sequence variant on the phenotype may not always be
direct or straightforward. For example, in an early genetic
study of lung cancer risk, the most prominent risk associa-
ted genomic locus (i.e. place in the genome) was linked to
genes that encode subunits of the nicotinic acetylcholine
receptor—thus influencing smoking behaviour rather than
more proximate causes of oncogenesis [10].
Given the promise of genetics to jump start research on psy-
chiatric disease mechanisms, significant efforts were made in
the 1990s and early 2000s with then available methodologies,
most notably linkage studies, which had proven successful in
identifying causative genes in rare monogenic disorders. The
failure of linkage studies for psychiatric disorders indicates
that the core assumption of this approach does not obtain for
these phenotypes; it was therefore possible to reject the hypoth-
esis that one or a few DNA sequence variants (alleles) of high
penetrance was responsible for disease within families with
multiple affected individuals. It became clear that risk for
common psychiatric disorders was polygenic as Gottesman
& Shields [11] predicted for schizophrenia. This means that
the genetic component of disease risk results from the additive
effects of many alleles of small effect, with none being necess-
ary or sufficient. In an individual, genetic loading for risk-
associated alleles (as opposed to neutral or potential protective
alleles) would act together with stochastic developmental
effects (such as somatic mutagenesis or chance patterns of
gene expression in the developing brain) and environmental
risk factors to produce illness. The predictions of Gottesman
& Shields [11] followed from their observation that schizo-
phrenia was transmitted within families in a non-Mendelian
fashion (i.e. not following patterns expected for Mendelian
dominant or recessive genes) and also from the failure of psy-
chiatric disorders to segregate as uniform symptom complexes
(thus undercutting the modern DSM classification before it
was written). Another, methodologically far weaker approach
than linkage, biological candidate gene studies and candidate
gene-by-environment studies were also widely attempted in
the 1990s—and unfortunately continue to this day despite
stark failure, [12]. These approaches, which presuppose prior
knowledge about causation to generate candidates, failed to
recognize and correct for multiple testing procedures, and
were vastly underpowered given what should have been
obvious, the low penetrance of common alleles that contribute
risk of psychiatric disorders. Indeed, a critical implication of
polygenicity is the need for very large sample sizes in genetic
studies given the need to identify alleles of low penetrance
against the very noisy background of normal human sequence
variation, comprised of tens of millions of sequence differ-
ences. A low penetrance risk allele for schizophrenia or
depression will have no observable effect on the phenotype
of interest except when the individual has an adequate
number of other risk alleles. Thus most individuals with any
given risk allele will not have the disorder, and depending
on allele frequency in the population, most peoplewith the dis-
order will not have any particular risk allele. Well conducted
association studies are therefore powered to test the hypothesis
that any given allele contributes to disease against a very large
number of different genetic backgrounds. Studies of such large
cohorts were simply not possible given the technology that
existed prior to the Human Genome Project.
2. Genomic technology rescues genetics—but
leaves neurobiology in peril
As has often been the case in the history of science, new tools
can unleash scientific progress by making possible seminal
new observations that engender new hypotheses [13]. For
example, without improvements in the grinding of lenses,
Galileo would not have been able to construct his telescopes
that in turn, permitted him to observe the four brightest
moons of Jupiter and thus convincingly alter our conception
of the solar system. In the case of human genetics, the devel-
opment of powerful new genomic and computational tools
motivated by the Human Genome Project and related efforts
made it possible to conduct unbiased, large-scale genetic
studies of diverse human phenotypes. Unlike biological
hypothesis-based candidate gene studies, modern unbiased
approaches are based on finding association of traits
with genetic markers or DNA sequences across the whole
genome (or sometimes the whole exome, the protein coding
regions of the genome) in a manner that is agnostic to bio-
logical hypotheses—a boon to psychiatry given its prior
lack of knowledge of disease mechanism. Inexpensive DNA
microarrays (‘gene chips’) made possible genome-wide
association studies (GWAS) involving very large case-control
cohorts to identify common disease-associated variants. Mas-
sively parallel DNA sequencing technology (often called
Next Generation sequencing) vastly increased throughput
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and accuracy while diminishing costs by many thousand-
fold. This has made possible well powered studies that
have begun associate rare alleles ascertained by DNA sequen-
cing with neuropsychiatric and other phenotypes [14]. Since
analysis of genetically complex human phenotypes, such as
neuropsychiatric disorders requires sample sizes beyond the
reach of individual laboratories, the technological revolution
in genomic could facilitate widespread success only with a
change in the organization of human genetics, the formation
of large international consortia that have demonstrated
their value by successfully amassing large samples, typically
many tens of thousands of individuals, and identifying DNA
sequence variation associated with diverse phenotypes, ran-
ging from anthropometric traits such as height [15] to risk
of schizophrenia [16].
The information now emerging from unbiased, large-
scale genetic studies of neuropsychiatric disorders is yielding
initial clues to their biological underpinnings. That said, there
remains a long and difficult road to travel if we are to under-
stand disease mechanisms and advance therapeutics. Even
assuming great success in the coming years in identifying a
large fraction of the risk alleles that contribute to psychiatric
disorders, and fine mapping loci identified by GWAS to
identify causative variation—no mean feat—there is no
guarantee that the resulting information will yield the desired
result of understanding pathogenesis and giving birth to
biomarkers, new treatments, and preventive interventions.
This is because there is no clear paradigm, no map, no play-
book, for follow-up biological studies of polygenic human
brain disease.
The successful and widely used approaches by which
biologists have studied gene function, most commonly the
introduction of a single penetrant gene into a cell line or trans-
genic mouse, are well calibrated to identify the main effects of
that gene against a single uniform genetic background of the
chosen cell line or inbred mouse strain. How do we study a
vast number of modestly penetrant alleles that alter human
cognition and behaviour? We should not expect any isolated
risk allele associated with psychiatric disorders to yield a
meaningful phenotype in a mouse. Not only is the penetrance
of almost all disease associated alleles low—the case not only
for all common risk alleles, but also for most protein alter-
ing rare alleles—but genetic background matters greatly.
Schizophrenia or depression require loading of many risk
alleles that each nudge brain development or brain function
toward illness. Given 80–90 million years of evolutionary
distance from our last common ancestor with rodents,
given the vastly different selective environments in which
rodents and primate evolved, and given the empirical docu-
mentation of very poor conservation of genomic regions
involved in regulating gene expression, we should not rely
onmouse models to understand processes of disease causation
that flow from polygenic risk. Given the large and punishing
burden of these disorders on individuals, families, and
societies, and a half-century in which both the efficacy
of pharmacologic treatments and the range of symptoms trea-
ted has failed to progress significantly [17], it is incumbent on
the field to embrace rather than avoid the experimental and
conceptual challenges posed by the polygenicity and hetero-
geneity of psychiatric disorders, no matter how difficult,
but to do so without falling prey to the kinds of intellec-
tually lethal shortcuts that characterized the era of candidate
gene studies.
3. What kind of evidence warrants biological
follow-up studies of genetic associations?
Even before thinking about a newmapwith which to navigate
polygenic terra incognita, wemust address the question of what
alleles and what genes can be considered well enough vali-
dated to warrant the investment in biological follow-up
studies. At this point in history, the successful approach of
basic science, which is to test biological hypotheses based on
knowledge and intuition, represents amoral hazard for studies
to follow up on genetics. What matters instead is the quality of
the design and statistical power of the underlying genetic
studies and the rigour of the analyses. Psychiatric genetics
has learned hard lessons over the past decades that absent
strong statistical evidence for association of an allele with the
selected phenotype, no degree of biological plausibility in the
mind of an investigator (which in this case should be recon-
strued as no more than bias), warrants biological follow-up
studies. Given the costs, human effort, and alternatives fore-
gone, successful exploitation of genetic information about
psychiatric phenotypes will require shared high standards by
both the genetics and neurobiology communities for signifi-
cance of associations. Sample size is the critical determinant
of whether a study has the power to detect associations with
the degree of certainty that would warrant follow-up [18].
For case-control association studies in neuropsychiatric gen-
etics, designs must take into account allele frequency (i.e.
whether the goal is to detect common or rare disease-associ-
ated variants), the likely effect size of disease-associated
variants, and the number of independent tests being per-
formed (which on a typical microarray used for GWAS is
typically about 1 million.) To illustrate the role of sample size
in psychiatric genetics, it is useful to use schizophrenia as an
example. An international consortium performing genome
wide (common variant) association in schizophrenia could
not find significant associations until it reached nearly 10 000
cases and 12 000 controls [19]. By 2014, this consortium, by
then enlarged, had performed GWAS on nearly 37 000 cases
and a far larger number of controls and found 108 genome-
wide significant loci associated with schizophrenia [16].
In ongoing not yet published studies involving yet larger
cohorts (approximately 65 000 affected subjects and 85 000
control subjects), the number of significant associations has
passed 250 (Stephan Ripke 2017, personal communication).
Given the large number of common and rare risk variants in
populations, individuals with schizophrenia (or any other
psychiatric disease phenotype) will have genetic loading
based on different combinations of risk alleles—a situation
that probably contributes along with chance and environ-
mental risk factors—to the well-known heterogeneity of
psychiatric disorders in terms of such factors as symptoms,
age of onset, severity and treatment responsiveness.
Despite such examples and the renewed focus of the
biology and psychology communities on rigour and replicabil-
ity, vastly underpowered candidate gene studies continue to be
performed and published. Reliance by the neuroscience and
psychology communities on false associations resulting from
poorly designed and underpowered genetic studies have
wasted significant resources and side-tracked the careers of
many young investigators.
In addition to their statistical power, the unbiased designs
of modern genetic association studies have contributed
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significantly to advancing biological investigation. In contrast
to biological hypothesis-driven studies, genome-wide associ-
ation studies can identify previously unsuspected biology.
For example, a large GWAS study of schizophrenia [16] led
to the identification of Complement Factor 4a (C4a) as a disease
associated gene, with a very high degree of statistical confi-
dence [20]. C4a, a component of the innate immune system,
was not previously considered in the context of neuropsychia-
tric disease. This ‘new biology’ discovered through large-scale,
unbiased genetics, has inspired a new focus on the role
of synaptic strength and synaptic refinement mediated by
complement proteins and microglia in schizophrenia.
Given the longstanding failure to advance therapeutics,
unbiased approaches also free investigators from the purgatory
of recycling a small number of hypotheses, many based on the
initial molecular targets of serendipitously identified psychia-
tric drugs. Schildkraut & Kety [21], pioneers who initially
formulated a biogenic amine hypothesis of depression, expli-
citly warned of the hazards of hypothesizing that disease
mechanisms would represent the biological inverse of thera-
peutic drug action, a form of post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy—
as if pain were due to an aspirin deficiency. They wrote that
despite the consistent ability of certain drugs to elevate or
depress moods by increasing or decreasingmonoamine neuro-
transmitter levels, what would be needed for insight into
pathogenic mechanisms would be a ‘direct demonstration
of the biochemical abnormality in the naturally occurring
illness’, not an inference based on administration of pharmaco-
logic agents. Further, they pointed out that even if such a
biochemical abnormality were demonstrated in patients, it
could still be an epiphenomenal downstream effect of some
other aetiological factors, including environmental and
experiential factors. Unfortunately, their advice was not well
heeded. Unbiased, large-scale genetics can now provide
the kind insights, grounded in the biology of affected
individuals that Schildkraut and Kety saw as necessary to
understand pathogenesis. Modern designs have the additional
advantage—in contrast to the monoamine theory, which in
fairness dates from a far earlier era—of identifying previously
unsuspected mechanisms.
4. Genetic risk for psychiatric disorders is
revealed to be fiendishly complex
The prediction of polygenicity made by Gottesman & Shields
[11] for schizophrenia, extends to all psychiatric phenotypes
that have been studied. It should be noted that there are rare
cases in which symptoms of ASDs or of schizophrenia are
associated with penetrant, damaging mutations in single
genes or with a copy number variant (CNV), which produces
a deletion, duplication, or more complex structural variation in
a segment of the genome. Many of the single gene mutations
associatedwith such cases occur de novo in the affected individ-
ual. Mutations that produce such severe neurodevelopmental
phenotypes typically block production of an active protein
from one of the human genes that do not tolerate haplo-
insufficiency—a situation in which healthy functioning
requires that both copies of a gene are active. In essentially all
cases of penetrant mutations or CNVs that increase risk of
ASDs or schizophrenia, themost penetrant phenotype intellec-
tual disability (Stefansson), and depending on the precise
genes involved, other developmental abnormalities may
occur, such as facial dysmorphology, cardiac defects, and epi-
lepsy. In these cases, often described as syndromal ASDs or
syndromal schizophrenia, the polygenic background still
appears to play a role in phenotype determination, although
more characterization is needed. Notwithstanding these
rare cases, the rule for psychiatric phenotypes is extreme
polygenicity—many alleles of small effect.
In the schizophrenia GWAS in which the Psychiatric Geno-
mics Consortium identified 108 independent genome-wide
significant loci for schizophrenia, the average odds ratio for
associated alleles was 1.08 [16]. This translates into 8% increase
in risk of a disorder with a population based rate of approxi-
mately 1%; thus, an average disease associated allele from
this study would increase risk of schizophrenia from 1% to
1.08%. Schizophrenia is highly heritable, but the aggregate her-
itability is divided into many small additive contributions. The
genetic loading of a person with schizophrenia represents a
subset (above some unknown threshold) from the far larger
number of risk alleles found in the population. For such
extreme allelic heterogeneity to give rise to an identifiable,
even if heterogeneous syndrome, it is generally hypothesized
is that the effects of these many DNA sequence variants must
ultimately converge on a far smaller number of biological
processes, molecular pathways, and neural cell types.
A further complexity results from the pleiotropic effects of
genes. In addition to significant allelic heterogeneity within a
disorder, there is overlapping genetic risk across disorders
[22]. Thus, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder share approxi-
mately 65% their common risk alleles [22], with still unknown
combinations of risk alleles probably underlying phenotypes
intermediate between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder
that are often subsumed the term ‘schizoaffective disorder’.
Genetic heterogeneity within disorder and sharing of risk
across disorders are inconsistent with the narrow categorical
definitions of disorders in the DSM-5 [4] Diverse patterns
of shared and unshared genetic risk characterize many
neuropsychiatric disorders [22].
It should also be noted that GWAS identifies places in
the genome (loci) linked to causal variation and that further
challenging steps are often required to identify the precise
sequence difference that contribute to disease phenotypes.
These and other steps will require much effort and ingenuity,
but the genetics community largely knows how to go about
them. In contrast, to this increasingly well-established map
for genetic studies, approaches to understand the effects of
polygenic influences on the biology underlying cognition,
emotion, and neuropsychiatric disorders still represents a
relatively trackless terra incognita.
5. From polygenic risk to psychiatric disease
mechanisms: a new map must include
non-reductionist strategies
Recent progress in neuroscience can scarcely be imagined
without the application of reductionist approaches to experi-
mentation. A classic example of success comes from
investigation of memory mechanisms. It would not have been
possible to gain significant scientific traction on mechanisms
that underlie encoding and consolidation of memories if the
initial experiments had been conducted in complexmammalian
brains—even though the ultimate goal was to understand
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mammalian mechanisms. Instead, Kandel and colleagues
began by investigating memory mechanisms in the sea slug
Aplysia californica, an organism with an extremely simple ner-
vous system. The greatly reduced complexity of the Aplysia
nervous system facilitated a mechanistic analysis that yielded
general principles relevant to the study of the far more complex
brains [23]. The selection of a reduced experimental system
must balance the simplicity required for successful application
of available technology against the degree of complexity
required achieve desired external generalizability. Aplysia fit
this need. It is a simple living system, but not so simple as to pre-
clude the application of experimental insights to investigation
of mammalian memory mechanisms. Like any free-living
organism, Aplysia needs to encode information about its
world and to retrieve it in response to appropriate cues if it is
to survive. The Aplysia nervous system is complex enough to
model fundamental neural building blocks of memory that
are conserved in evolution to the degree that they are generaliz-
able to mammals in principle if not in every detail. In short, the
utility of reductionist strategies depends on the degree towhich
the experimental system iswell suited to answer scientific ques-
tions being asked in the short term,while informing longer term
goals of the research programme.
Experimental paradigms in wide current use to investigate
biological functions of genes, including disease associated
genes, is to insert the gene into a clonal cell line or to generate
a transgenic mouse in an inbred genetic background. Phenoty-
pic differences resulting from the transgene are then identified
in the modified cell line or mouse and compared with an
appropriate control cell line or mouse that is genetically identi-
cal except for the inserted gene. Such approaches typically
minimize confounding background ‘noise’ by selection of a
uniform genetic background thus improving the likelihood
that phenotypic differences from controls are due only to the
experimentally introduced gene. Such reductionist methods
have yielded important new information about the effects of
protein truncating mutations in genes that have been associ-
ated with syndromal ASDs, including Neuroligin-3 [24] and
Shank-3 [25]. These rigorously conducted studies have
advanced understandings of the function of such disease-
associated genes as Neuroligin-3 and Shank-3 and deficits
that can result when they are made to be haploinsufficient. In
addition these studies suggest new ideas relevant to the discov-
ery of new therapeutic interventions. However, I have come to
believe that such studies are better construed as basic science
rather than as the production of disease models and would
argue that this distinction is significant. Designation as an
‘animal model’ of disease invites misleading inferences that
the animal reproduces important aspects of human disease
mechanisms and further that it might be used to predict the
efficacy of therapeutics. Designation as an experimental
system for basic investigation invites a more exploratory
posture with respect to disease biology and therapeutics.
In the past, it had been widely accepted that animals
manipulated by genetic engineering, environmental pertur-
bations, or breeding for disease-like traits could be validated
as models of neuropsychiatric disorders based on three criteria
(see [26]). Face validity entails a judgement that the animal’s
phenotype captures important characteristics of the human dis-
ease. The criterion of predictive validity is said to be met when
assays conducted in an animal successfully predicts treatment
efficacy in patients. Construct validity is based on the use of
genetic or environmental factors in the construction of the
putative model that are associated with disease aetiology in
humans. Nestler & Hyman [26] have been sceptical of the con-
cepts of face and predictive validity. Face validity suffers from
its frequent reliance on subjective judgements, but more impor-
tantly because it is not a form of validation at all. This criterion
would validate phenocopies, i.e. animals with phenotypes
similar to those of ill humans, but with different biological
underpinnings. Examples of convergent evolution (e.g. that
insects and birds both have wings) should serve as a potent
warning against reliance on surface phenomenology. Similarly,
the criterion of predictive validity does not demand mechan-
isms that might be shared between the human disease and
the constructed animal, and can thus represent a chance
phenomenon. As a historical matter, animal based assays
such as the forced swim test, have not yielded any drugs for
approved psychiatric disorders except those that recapitulate
the mechanism of prototype drugs involved in development
of the assay—and first identified by their effects in humans [17].
Based on the findings now emerging from unbiased,
large-scale genetic studies, I have grown pessimistic about
the concept of construct validity, even with respect to the
more penetrant mutations associated with syndromal ASDs
and syndromal schizophrenia [3]. As is well known, the use
of mice and rats as translational models of human neuropsy-
chiatric disorders is severely limited by significant differences
in neural cells types and the structure and function of neural
circuits, most notably, but not limited to prefrontal cortex and
its projections, which play critical roles in schizophrenia,
mood and anxiety disorders, and the many other psychiatric
disorders that affect cognitive control of thought, emotion,
and behaviour. Such limitations in translatability are unsur-
prising given the 80–90 million years of evolutionary
divergence since the last shared common ancestor of rodents
and primates. More significantly, rodents and primates have
evolved with vastly different selection pressures given the
evolutionary niches they occupy. Rats and mice are noctur-
nal, modestly social, and specialized for olfaction; humans
are diurnal, richly and complexly social, and highly visual.
While these considerations militate against the acceptance
of rodents as veridical models of disease, the do not argue
against their use for diverse basic investigations including
studies relevant to disease, especially given powerful technol-
ogies optimized for use in mice and rats such as optogenetics
and in vivo microscopy.
Even if the neurobiology community foreswears the tra-
ditional concept of an animal model of disease in order to
enhance interpretive discipline and reduce risks of self-decep-
tion, a severe challenge remains. In what experimental systems
will it be possible to interrogate the causal influences exerted
by diverse combinations of modestly penetrant alleles associ-
ated with psychiatric disorders? The challenges posed by
polygenic background have recently been highlighted in ele-
gant experiments conducted in mice. The use of inbred
mouse strains as a background against which to study intro-
duced transgenes is meant to minimize differences between
experimental animals and controls. However, this practice
also limits the generalizability of the results. A recent systema-
tic study highlights this long-recognized problem. Sittig et al.
[27] engineered mice to carry a severe mutation in one of two
genes in which milder genetic variants have been found to be
associated with neuropsychiatric disorders, including schizo-
phrenia. When they bred the transgene into different inbred
mouse lines (i.e. into different genetic backgrounds), they
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observed marked differences in the phenotypes, including the
occasional disappearance of a trait or a change in its direction-
ality compared with controls of the same strain. Sittig et al. [27]
conclude that the phenotypic effects of rare deleterious
mutations depend not only on the mutated gene, but also on
its interactions with genetic background. This conclusion is
fully consistent with observations in human patients in
which the same penetrant single-gene mutation or CNV
yields highly variable phenotypes [28].
Given that polygenic combinations of alleles underlie
psychiatric disease risk in humans, and that noncoding regions
of the human genome, which are poorly conserved across
evolution, contain most of the common disease-associated
loci, the already distant possibility of a genetic mouse model
of schizophrenia or a mood disorder fades to impossibility.
Moreover, the common and rare variants that contribute to
risk of common psychiatric disorders have low penetrance,
i.e. contribute small additive increments of risk that can pro-
duce a disease phenotype only in the context of many other
human risk alleles. This signifies that transgenic mice that
have constructed with common psychiatric disease risk var-
iants cannot be expected to produce a disease-relevant
phenotype, and assertions to the contrary are misleading.
6. Investigating terra incognita
It is important to state that there are currently no ideal exper-
imental approaches to study polygenic human brain disease,
at least without still undreamt-of technologies to advance
human experimental biology. What is needed, if we are to
take polygenic risk seriously rather than retreating to the
basic investigation of mutations that cause rare monogenic dis-
orders, are experimental systems that permit the interrogation
and experimental manipulation of many human genomes
(i.e. many different permutations that contain diverse risk and
non-risk alleles). Successful study of many different genomes
under different conditions will require inexpensive high
throughput experimental systems and assays in order to
achieve adequate statistical power to in the face of heterogeneity
and irreducible experimental variability. Perhaps the most
promising initial approaches are based on human cellular
models generated by reprogramming (e.g. stem cell technology)
and genome engineering, technologies that have emerged and
matured only in the last decade [29]. Here I sketch variations
on this theme that are still in early stages of development, recog-
nizing that early technologies may not live up to their promise,
and that even the most advanced three dimensional cellular
models will not recapitulate human cognition or behaviour.
Thus, while human cellular models will probably prove central
to the interrogation of polygenic disease mechanisms, they will
need to be complemented by basic animal research and by
advances in human experimental biology.
The ability to reprogramme readily available human cells
such as fibroblasts, either into pluripotent cells that can then
be coaxed into any cellular phenotype [29], or directly into
neurons, has made it possible to grow human neurons and
glial cells with diverse human genetic background in vitro. In
many current large-scale genetic studies, it is now an option
to ask consenting patients for skin biopsies or extra blood
samples out of which to produce pluripotent cell lines. There
have been early reports that have compared neurons derived
from three or four individuals with schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder with healthy control subjects with claims of signifi-
cant phenotypic differences. Given the heterogeneity of these
conditions, it is extremely risky to draw conclusions from
such small samples [18]. However, better designed and better
powered studies are not far off. As the relevant technologies
advance, high throughput methods of comparing cells derived
from many individuals will become increasingly feasible.
An important goal is to able to reprogramme, perturb, or
otherwise probe cells from many individuals including those
with disease phenotypes, different degrees of polygenic risk,
or rare penetrant mutations under near-identical conditions.
Gene variants can be added to or subtracted from the genomes
of any cells (and thus from any human genetic background)
using genome engineering technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9.
Given a focus on brain and brain disorders, there are
additional complexities. There likely several thousand distinct
cell types in the human brain; determination of their identities
based on such factors as their stereotypic locations, mor-
phologies and transcriptomes is a matter of intense current
effort. At present it is only possible to generate a small minority
of neural cell types for in vitro for experimentation; however,
the number will grow. Help in studying neuropsychiatric dis-
orders will arrive from the intersection of current efforts to
generate a cell census of the brain (including a transcriptome
of each cell type) and genetic studies. It will be possible
using the resulting databases to identify those cell types that
express a significant number of the genes associated with
particular neuropsychiatric disorders.
The flat, two-dimensional cultures of individual human
neural cell types described above have the advantage of relative
simplicity and accessibility for manipulation. Although the
initial actions of genes occur within cells, the symptoms and
impairments of neuropsychiatric disorders do not reflect only
cell-autonomous processes. There is much evidence for altera-
tions in the structure and function of synaptic connections of
the brain, making it critical to develop experimental systems
in which multiple cell types can be elaborated and permitted
to form synapses. Diverse approaches have therefore been
taken to the production of so-called three-dimensional cultures.
When such cultures are patterned to produce a limited number
of neural cell types, they are often described as neural spheroids
[30]. When permitted to develop over long periods and to
develop a significant diversity of neural cell types they are
called brain organoids [31]. Human brain organoids that have
been grown for 8 months have been shown by electron
microscopy and neurophysiology to develop synaptic spines
and mature synapses. Physiological examination shows that
spontaneous activity occurs between neurons in such organoids
[32]. Both spheroids and organoids can bemade fromanyavail-
able genetic background and from cell lines that have
undergone genome engineering to introduce or edit out genes
of interest, including genes associated with disease.
Both two and three dimensional human cellularmodels are
experimental systems of reduced complexity, but they have the
important property of permitting the study of neurons, glia
and synapseswith highly diverse genetic backgrounds derived
from peoplewho are well or who have a disorder under study.
It is also proving possible to study cells frommany individuals
in parallel to maximize comparability of experimental con-
ditions. However, it one has the goal of understanding the
effects of disease riskor full-blown illness on brain circuits, cog-
nition, and behaviour, then cellular models, while informative,
will no longer suffice. Animals are critical for many basic
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science questions, including questions related to disease mech-
anisms, but given the polygenic nature of risk for all common
neuropsychiatric disorders, it is an open question to what
degree animals can be useful in translational science [33,34].
One promising avenue, albeit one that uses animals as a
living incubator rather than as an independent experimental
system is to transplant human neural progenitors derived
from pluripotent cell lines into animal brains [35]. These cell
lines can be made from disease affected individuals, diverse
genetic backgrounds, and can also be engineered to express
reporter genes for easy identification. In addition to cellular
systems and experiments in animals, increased attention to
human biology will pay important scientific dividends.
7. Summary
Here I have described possible causes of the failure to
advance understandings of neuropsychiatric disease mechan-
isms and therapeutics over many decades. I believe that
unbiased, large-scale genetics may be the most effective
source of molecular clues that we will ever possess. Given
the highly polygenic basis of genetic risk for neuropsychiatric
disorders, I would argue that such genetic studies be prose-
cuted to the point of diminishing biological returns, a point
at which the convergence of genetic information of molecular
pathways, neural cell types, and biological processes should
be adequately clear to be scientifically actionable. Discovery
of an unsuspected role for complement factor 4a in schizo-
phrenia is an early demonstration of the power of unbiased
genetics at scale to reveal new biological insights. I have
also reflected on the kinds of experimental systems that will
be needed to interpret the functional consequences of poly-
genic risk. The current approach of generating transgenic
mouse lines cannot answer the needs of interrogating pheno-
types with a polygenic basis. Despite the strong constraints of
operating within an entrenched paradigm [36], the unmet
needs of patients should motivate a movement toward exper-
imental systems that will make good use of the information
now emerging from successful genetic analyses.
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